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NATURE OF THE CASE
This- is an action·brought by plaintiffs for personal
injuries sustained as a result of a collision between a
jeep in which Matthew Harris was a passenger and a Utah
Transit Authority bus.
DISP0SrTI:ON l:N THE LOWER COURT
A jury trial was commenced in the Second· Judicial District
Court of Weber County with the H.onorable Ronald O" Hyde presiding.
·<'9

The jury returned a special verdict form in favor

of defendants and agains-t plainti.ffs

o

A judgment was

accordingly entered finding no cause of action against
defendants.

Plaintifts •· motion for a new trial was sub-

sequently denied by the lower court.
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.RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court jud~ent
entered pursuant to the jury verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants have raised several issues in this appeal
including their claim that the trial court erred in finding
th.e jeel? driver negligent as a matter of law and in failing
to find the nus driver negligent as a matter of law.
Because both. of these claims necessarily involve an extensive

1

review of the record, it would serve no purpose to review
in great detail the facts at this juncture.

However, a

brief overview of the. accident and the trial may oe helpful
to this Court.
On March 7, 1977, the plaintiff Matthew H:arris was riding

in the passenger seat of a jeep driven by Rodney
(Tr. 5471.

c. Talbot.

Another hoy, Kevin Della Lucia, was riding in

the middle of the jeep in a special box designed for jeeps
equipped with bucket seats.

(Tr. 554}.

The boys were on

an errand for their teacher at Weber High in Ogden and were
en route to Bonneville High. to deliver some papers.

(Tr.

546) •

The jeep was proceeding south on W'ashlngton Boule-

vard.

The weatherwas dry and clear.

(Tr. 548) •

Meanwhile, defendant Lester Loosemore was proceeding
on h.is assigned

~r:oute

with the Utah Transi.t Authority.

The route basically encompassed all of washington Boulevard.
(Tr. 609t.

Mr. Loosemore n.ad already made two trips that
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I

morning and was

proceedi~~

on his third trip.

south on Washington Boulevard

(Tr. 613).

At approximately 1700 North and Washington Boulevard
Mr. Loosemore saw a passenger waiting near a mailbox and
bus stop.

(Tr. 621).

The area in which the passenger was

standing had no curb and there was no designated stopping
area.

(Tr. 623).

It is undisputed that the bus made a

gradual and normal pullove.r in order to pick up the waiting
passenger.

(Tr. 64 O, 686, 663)_.

The evidence adduced at

trial was consistent in showing that the bus had stopped
at the time of the accident, although the length of such
stop varied from witness to witness ..
At the place of the accident Washington Boulevard is
42 feet wide from the edge of the as.phalt to the edge of

the asphalt.

(Tr .. 513}.

There are two lanes in both the

northbound and southbound directione
3-16).

(Plaintiff's Exhibits

The bus was parked so that its left side was en-

croaching in approximately half of the outside traffic
southbound lane.

(Tr. 528}.

There was, therefore,

approximately 15 feet of unobstructed s·outhbound lanes
still

remaini~g.

(Tro 533}.

Although the bus driver

stated that he felt unsafe in pulling off the road any
further, the shoulder to the right of the bus was
physically large enough to accommodate the entire bus.
(Tr. 622, 625).
It was undisputed that the bus was approximately 10 feet
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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four large rear lights· which are activated by the brake,
turn signals, and flashers.
It

(Tr. 7031.

is als·o undisputed that Washington Boulevard at the

point of the accident is straight with no curves.

This

straightaway extends hack approximately two miles from the
site of the accident.

(Tr, 761}.

The speed limit on

Washington Boulevard in this section of the highway is 50
miles an hour.
Wh_ile there wa,S some dispute as to the exact speed the
jeep was: traveling,. it was generally- assumed by the various
experts that it was traveling at a speed of approximately
50 miles an hour when the collision_ occurred.

The driver

of the jeep testified that he did not recall seeing the bus
until some 10 to 50. feet prior to hitting it.

(Tr. 562}.

The driver- swerved to the le;ft and glancingly struck the
left portion of the rear of the bus.

The jeep then proceede

to the side of the hus where it stopped.

(Tr. 5501.

The

plaintiff Matthew HaI:"ris was caught in between the jeep and
th.e :Ous and pulled trom the jeep onto the pavement.

(Tr.

551).

The trial of this matter was commenced on December 4,
1979, and continued for three additional days.

Extensive

evidence was presented by both sides as to the circumstances
and probable causes of th.is accident.
Police Chief Earl

~-

The-plaintiff called

CaI:"roll who arrived at the scene and

took extensive. pictures of the accident.

(Tr. 494-5061,
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Officer Rex Cragun of the Riverdale City Police Department also testified on behalf of plaintiff as to the
physical measurements- and investigation he conducted.
(Tr. 507-533).

Sgt. Charles Beaman of the North Ogden

City Police Department related his observations at
the time of the accident and his subsequent visit to
the scene for accident reconstruction4

(Tr . 5 3 4 .. 5 4 4) •

Plaintiff called the driver of the jeep; Rodney
Carl Talbot,who described his version of how the accident
occurred.

(Tr. 546-565}.

In addition, the passenger of the

jeep Kevin Dela Lucia gave his- recollection as to the
circumstances of the accident.

(Tr. 566-574).

Helen

Hollingshead, Robert Preston, and Gloria Myers were all
driving separate vehicles behind the jeep and were also
called by plaintiff to describe their various observations.
(Tr. 575-600t.,
Plaintiff examined various· employees aTl..d former employees
of defendant Utah Transit Authority.

The bus driver-defendant

Lester LoosemQre was examined as to his memory of the events
occurring on the day of the accident.

fTr. 600-649.l.

Russell Simonsen, a supe.rvisor of the defendant, was interrogated as to his observations when he arrived at the accident
siteo

(Tr. 650-656).

Finally, Daniel Newland, defendant's

shop foreman, was examined as to various mechanical aspects
of plaintiffs' case, including their claim that the rear
lights of the bus were not functioning correctlyo

(Tr.

689-717).
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Plaintiffs als<> called Rex Child and Barbara Warner who

were passengers on the bus at the time of the accident and
who testified as to their recall of the accident.

(Tr.

657-664 i 686-688) •

The plaintiff, Matthew

Ha~rris,

testified as to his

limited memory of the day of the accident and as to the
damages he incurred because of the accident.

(Tr. 665-686).

Finally, plaintiffs called Robert Quinn as an expert witness
to recreate plaintiffs' version of the circumstances surrounding the accident including plaintiffs•- theory that the
defendant driver was negligent in the location of the vehicle
and in the maintenance of the bus.

_(Tr. 717-751}.

At the conclusion of plaintiffs•· case defendants moved
for a directed verdi.ct against th.e plaintiffs on the grounds
that plaintiffs did not show- that the actions of defendants
were the proximate cause of Mr. Harris' injuries.

After

extensive argument the lower court denied defendants' motion.
(Tr. 752-7611.

Defendants called Diane Child and Linda Mark who were both[
passengers in the bus on the day of the accident.
768; 8Q6-808).

(Tr. 761-

In addition, defendants called Trina Farr;

who observed the jeep as it was being driven down washington
Boulevard just prior to th_e accident...

(Tr. 809_-815).

Finally, defendants called their own reconstruction
expert, Professor Rudolph Limpert, who related ·that in his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

opinion the cause of the accident was the failure of the
jeep driver to pay proper attention to the road in front
of him.

(Tr. 7 6 8- 8 0 6) .

Both plaintiff and defendants moved for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of the case and both motions were
denied by the trial court.

(Tr. 816..-8171.

The matter was

submitted to the jury on special verdict after instructions
by the court.

Th.e verdict returned by the jury found the

defendants not negligent in either the maintenance of the
bus or in the bus's ope:ration.

(Tr. 235}.

A judgment was

entered in accordance with the special verdict form.

(Tr.

405-406).

Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and a hearing was held
on March 14, 1980, at which time the lower court denied
plaintiffs' requesto

(Tr. 407, 475, 476)0

Plaintiffs

appeal from the judgment entered by the. lower court and
from the order denying new- trial..

(Tr. 4 77)

o

ARGUMENT

l?O:LNT I
THE TRI:AL COURT WAS CORRECT IN INSTI:WCTING THE
J·URY- THAT RODNEY' TALBOT WAS NE"GLI:GENT.

As noted previously, the lower court declined to direct
a verdict in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs~

At .th_e conclusion of the trial the lower court

did, however, instruct the jury '"that the driver of the
jeep, Rodney Tal:Oot, was negligent as a matter of :1aw."
Sponsored253).
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
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...,

committed· error i.n making this. determination.
brief, pp. 4 ..... a1..

(Appellants'

Tni.s· argument is without merit,

Rodney Talbot was not a party in this lawsuit.

Because

of the "guest statute..., plain.tiff was unable to sue Mr. Talbot
for his injuries.

Likewise, def.endants were unable to

bring any third party complaint against Mr. Talbot since
to do so would circumvent the guest statute.

:Denver

&

Rio

Grande Western Railroad v. Dewayne Construction Company,
552 P. 2d 117 (Utah 19.76).

Defendants did maintain, however,

that the conduct of Mr. Talbot was the sole proximate cause
of the accident and, therefore, even if the bus driver
Loosemore had be.en negligent his negligence did not cause
the accident.
The lower court instructed the jury that Mr. Talbot was
negligent as a matter of law in the operation of the jeep.
He did not, however, instruct the jury that Talbot's conduct
was the proximate cause of the accident,

The question of

proximate cause was left to the jury to decide as stated
in Instruction 14 given by the Court.

(Tr. 2531.

Similarly,[

the Court did not ins.truct the jury as to the negligence of
bus driver or th_e proximate cause of his conduct.

This too

was left for a jury determination.
'I'hus, the only is:s·ue. which was decided as a matter of law
by the Court was th.at

ot the. negligence of the jeep driver.

A review of the record most favorabl·e to plaintiffs clearly
shows that the Court was· correct in this ruling in that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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reasonable minds could not

negligent.

Plaintiffs called Rodney Carl Talbot as a witness.

Mr.

Talbot was extremely candid and truth in his answers,

both on direct examination and cross-examination.

He

stated that on the day of the accident he arrived at
Weber High_ School and was asked by one of his teachers
to deliver papers to Bonneville High School.

(Tr. 54 6) .

At that time.he conferred with both Matthew Harris and
Kevin Lucia and it.was decided that they should also
accompany him on the trip after they obtained permission
from their teacher.

(Tr. 547).

Mr. Talbot testified t:nat his jeep was in excellent
condition and that the :Drakes h.ad been completely redone.
Upon leaving the school, Mr. Talbot di:o"'le, Matthew Harris
was in the passenger seat, and Kevin Lucia was. in a specially
(Tr. 547, 554) ..

designed box between the two seatso

Mr. Talbot stated that the weather was dry and clear as
he proceeded south on Washington Boulevard.

(Tr. 548) .

He stated he was proceeding between 40 and 50 miles an
hour with the normal flow of traffic.

(Tr. 549) .

He had

traveled approximately a mile in the right inside lane
before the accident occurredo
On

dir~ct

(Trp

54~I.

examination he stated that there came a

time when he:.:suddenly saw the bus in front of him..

He said

he looked up, saw the bus and glanced in his mirror to the
left to make sure the left lane was clear,. and then began
..-.9' ....
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to turn and brake to go around the bus.

The jeep grazed

the left side of the stopped bus and finally halted in fron1
of the bus.

(Tr. 550).

Counsel for defendants on cross-examination extensively

1

examined Mr. Talbot as to the details concerning his testiJ
on direct.

He stated, for example, that the visibility on

that day was good.

He could not recall what the

(Tr. 553).

three boys were doing prior to the accident although he
stated that they could have been talking among themselves.
(Tr. 555).
Defendants' counsel then engaged in the following
dialogue with Mr. Talbot.

Q

Now you indicated on direct examination
that you looked up and saw the bus ahead
of you?

A

Yes, uh-huh.

Q

Was your attention directed to the floor?
I don't understand. Did you actually
physically look up and see the bus?

A

I don't know where my attention was.
did just look up or look.

Q

But your attention was not directed to the
front of your vehicle, though; was it?
I mean, you weren't looking out the window
and seeing what was in front of you, were
you?

A

Not at that second, I must not have been.

Q

So you didn't see the bus the second before
though, did you? You didn't see the bus at
any time until you swerved to miss it, did
you?

I
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A

I may have seen it be=

w

I

Q

You're indicating to me that you saw the
bus a number of -- hundreds of yards in
front of you, and then continued to drive
toward it, though?

A

No, I'm saying I may have seen it before,
but I don't recall seeing it before.

Q

The first time you recalled seeing the bus
on this occasion, though, was when you
looked up and saw it there in front of
you, and you swerved to try to miss it?

A

That's the first time I remember seeing
it.

Q

Okay. No other times prior to that few
moments prior to the accident did you recall
seeing the bus?

A

I

don 1 t remember seeing it.
(Emphasis added) .,

(Tr. 558-559).

Subsequent to this dialogue additional testimony was given
by the witenss which also illustrates the correctness of the
lower court r· s ruling ..
Q

You werentt paying any attention as to whether
the bus was moving?

A

I couldn •· t tell if it was stopped or stopping
when I hit it -- when I seen it.

Q

So it could have been either one?

A

Right.

Q

All right.. ,And prior to the time. that you
glanced up and saw this bus and made these
maneuvers to avoid the rear end of the bus,
you didn't know what the bus was doing, do
you? I mean, you didn't see it slow down
and stop, or you didn't see the passengers
that they were picking up there; did you?

A

No.

So you don't know whether the bus stopped
gradually or whether it stopped quickly, or
what, because you didn •· t s·ee it? It's
true, you didn •· t see the bus prior to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A

No.

Q

And you can give us no estimate in car
lengths· or anything how far you were away
when you first saw that bus?

A

I would just be a gues-s.
you an exact answer.

Q

You can't give us any type of a reasonable
estimate?

A

It would be just a guess, anywhere from
10 to 50 feet.
It would be a guess.

Q

You didntt have any trouble seeing the
bus as you looked up and ·saw it, did you?

A

No.

Q

It was right th.ere as big as life, wasn't it?

A

Right.

I '.COuldn •- t give

* * *
Q

When you looked up and saw th.is bus, there
as big as life as we discussed, you didn't
really make any observations-, any detailed
observation, of the rear of the bus other
tnan to s-ee th.at it was there and then
decide that you had to do something or else
you were going to run into the back of iti
isn't that true? You didn"t make any
detailed observation of the color. You
already told us you don"t know what color
it was. You didn't make any detailed
observation of the light, did you?

A

No.
I just seen the bus- and tried to
avoid it.

** *
Q

I guess the thing is, Rod, would it be fair
to say th_at for s·ome reason you just didn • t
see the. bus until you were too close to miss
it, and.i:is'? you collided with the bus, is
that a. ~a~r statement?
.,...12-
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A

Yes.

(Tr. 56 5) .

(Emphasis added) .

Likewise, Kevin Lucia, the other passenger in the jeep,
stated that he did not see the bus until some 30 or 40 feet
from the back of the bus.

At that time he stated he knew

the bus was stopped and had no difficulty in seeing it
since visability was good that day.

He also could not

recall where he was looking prior to seeing the bus.
(Tr. 5 71-57 3) .
Regardless· of the question of proximate causation, it
cannot be doubted that the driver of the jeep was negligent
as a matter of law in failing to see a stopped bus which
was 10 feet wide and 12 feet high on a clear dry morning
with no obstacles in front of the jeep and with a two
mile straightaway '::_:>receding. the location of the bus.
Obviously, for whatever reason, the occupants in the jeep
were preoccupied with some activity for a considerable
length of time since the driver of the jeep did not recall
ever seeing the bus in front of him prior to impact.
Defendants argued that the question of proximate cause
was also clear in that the driver of the jeep caused the
accident.

The trial court, however, rejected this argument

and submitted the question of proximate causation to the
jury, even though this Court on previous occasions has
affirmed a lower court'"s holding, as. a matter of law,
to both the issue of negligence and proximate cause in
factual situations similar to the instant case.
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In Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Itic. , 3 6 6 P. 2d 9 8 9
(Utah 19611 this Court affirmed a lower court"s judgment
n.o.v. in favor of a stopped truck where a Greyound bus
ran into t.he truck on a clear night with no obstacles in
the way.
Likewise, in Anderson v. Parsons Red-E-Mix Paving
Company, 467 P.2d 45

(Ut~

1970), this Court affirmed a

lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as a
matter of law on the basis that the plaintiff's conduct
in running into a parked Red-E-Mix truck was both
negligent and was the proximate cause of the accident.
As this Court stated:
In the instant case th.e collision occurred in
the middle of the afternoon in broad daylight
on a clear day; and there was nothing either
to obstruct the vision or distract the
attention of the host driver Kim Mortenson
betwee.n Main Street and this large Red-E-Mix
truck standing th.ere "·as big as life and
twice as· natural"· on the street. Id. at 47.
In the instant case, Mr. Talbot also testified that the bus
was "there as big as life" and was standing there "like a
sore thumb."

(Tr. 562, 565}.

Certainly, the testimony of

the driver and the passenger of the jeep clearly establish
as a matter of law that the driver negligently failed
to maintain a proper lookout for hazards in front of him
and the lower court was correct in so instructing the
jury.
:Plaintiffs' arguments as to the operation of the tail . .
lights and the location of the bus do not affect

a
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Ii

fi..nding

of negligence on the part of the jeep driver.

Even if it

is assumed arguendo that the lights on the bus were not
working properly and that the bus had been negligently
parked in the right inside lane, this would still not
eliminate a finding of negligence on the part of the jeep
driver in failing to observe the stopped vehicle.
The negligence O·f the bus driver and the maintenance of
the vehicle goes solely to the question of proximate
causation.

This issue, however, was submitted to the

jury for their determination.
Even plaintiffs' counsel in arguing against a motion
for directed verdict acknowledged that the driver of the
jeep may have been negligent in not observing the situation
but was still entitled to a jury question as to proximate
causation.

(Tr. 758-759).

The trial court refused to

grant defendants' motion for directed verdict and instead
submitted the question of proximate causation to the
jury..

eased upon the evidence, plaintiffs were entitled

to no more th.an this opportunity and arguably were not
entitled to any opportunity before a juryG
Finally, the Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines case,
cited by appellants, is not contrary to the position of
defendants.

(Appellants' brief, p. 8}9

In that case,

a- factual issue existed as to the proximate causation of
the accident.

In addition, there was obvious1y no clear

evidence that the automobile following the bus was negligent
as a.matter of law.

For this reason both the question
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of negligence and proximate causation were submitted to
the jury.

Even in that case, however, Justice Crockett in

a dissent stated that he could see no conduct on the
part of the bus which proximately caused the injury since
the driver drove into the rear of the bus in broad daylight
and was therefore the sole proximate cause of the collision.
414 P .. 2d at 89.
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in instruc

ing the jury that the jeep driver was negligent as a matter I
of law.
POINT

r:r.

THE COURT CORRECTLY SUBMITTED THE ISSUE OF
DEFENDANT LOOSEMORE'S NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
Appellant argues that the evidence of Loosemore's
negligence was at least as strong as Talbotts and that
therefore. the Court sltould have also ruled Loosemore negligen,
(Appellantst brief, p. 9).
A review of the issues presented at trial together with
the evidence adduced at trial shows that appellantst claim
lacks any validity.
Plaintiffs asserted that Loosemore or defendant UTA was
negligent in three respects.

First, that Loosemore violated

Section 41-6-101, U.C.A., relating to parking on a highway;
second, that the lights of the bus were not functioning
correctly and therefore failed to warn the jeep driver;
and third, Loosemore failed to keep a proper lookout.
None of these contentions, however, were

und-i ~rm-+- able
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as was the negligence of the jeepti

of the conflicting evidence clearly shows this.
Section 41-6-101, U.C.A., provides that no person
should park or leave a vehicle on a paved or traveled
highway if it is ''practical to stop, park, or to leave
such vehicle off such part of said highway . "

The

statute then continues th.at in any event an unobstructed
width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle
shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles
and a clear view of such stopped vehicle must be available
from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the
highway.
As noted earlier, the total width of the road from
asphalt to asphalt was 42 feet.

(Tr. 5131.

The bus

was partially on the shoulder of the road and partially
on the lane adjoining the road"

There still remained

15 feet of unobstructed southbound lanes· available to
passing motorists..

The vis·ihili ty of the bus was clearly

in excess of 20Q feet in each direction and, in fact,
was several miles.
While plaintiffs maintained there was no reason for the
bus driver to fai.l to pull en ti.rely over to the. shoulder
of the highway, Mr. Loosemore testified that YE. felt unsafe
in pulling any further into such area because of a large
ditch.which adjoined the shoulder of the road.
624).

(Tr. 623-

He stated furth.er that it would have been unsafe

for him to have gone any closer towards the awaiting
-11~
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passenger since he would have had to drive directly toward
her rather than

pulli~g

up to the side of her.

(Tr.

644-645}.

Loosemore further testified that upon seeing the passenge
some 300 or 400 feet 6ack on the road that he activated
his right turn signal and maintained the signal while he
was stopped.

(Tr. 640-·641}.

He stated further that during

the stop h_e kept his foot on the brake which would
activate the rear brake lights as well as the turn signal
light which was already on.

(Tr • 6 4 0-6 41) •

Thus, there was first a jury question as to whether the
statute itself was violated.

The jury certainly could have

believed that it was, under the circumstances, "impractical"
to pull over any further on the shoulder of the road in light
of the position of the passengers.
In any event, even if the driver was guilty of violating
the parking statute such violation is still only prima

~

evidence of negligence and is subject to justification or
excuse.
574

P~2d

In Intermountain Farmers Association v. Fitzgerald, (
1162 (Utah 1978), it was said:

This court has long held that the violation
of a statute does not necessarily constitute negligence per se and may be
considered only as evidence of negligence • • • .
This rule. was estaolished in Thompson v. Ford Motor Compan11
39.5 P.2d 62 (Utah 1964} where this Court stated that the
violation of a safety standard is subject to justification
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or excuse if the evidence is such that it reasonably could
be found that th.e conduct was nevertheless within the
standard of reas·onable care under the circumstances.
Thus, the jury was clearly presented with two factual
issues on this first contention alone:

first, was the

statute violation; second, if so, was the conduct of the
defendant nevertheless reasonable.

The Court could not

rule defendantts conduct in parking to be negligence as a
matter of law.
Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants were negligent
in the maintenance of the bus in th.at the rear lights
improperly functioned.

Again, the.re was conflicting

evidence as to the operability of these lights which
clearly presented a jury question.
Plaintiffs calle.d·several witnesses who stated they
could not recall seeing the lights either preceding or subsequent to the accident.

Defendants, on the other hand,

produced several other witnesses who stated the contrary.
Exhibits 7, 8 and 5 show· lights on the bus immediately
following the accident..

Sgt. Charles Beaman testified that

he recalled seeing flashing lights on the bus when he
arrived at the scene.

CTr. 543}.

Mr. Loosemore testified

that the lights on the dashboard indicate each time a turn
signal and a brake light is working and if the lights on the
dashboard do not come on it indicates that the outside
lights· are not functioning.

(Tr. 635).

At the time of the
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operating.

(Tr. 640-641).

Mr. Russe.11 Simonsen, a supervisor of UTA, stated that

when he arrive.a some 10 minutes- after the accident he
observe.d the front hazard lights flashi.ng and the rear
right side. hazard ligh_t flashing.
been damage.d in the accident..

The left light had

(Tr. 650-654}.

Mr. Daniel

Newland, the shop foreman of UTA, stated that it would not
be possible for the panel lights of the bus to come on if
the outside lights were not functioning.

(Tr. 7071.

Diane Child testified that as she was sitting on the
bus at the time of the accident she heard the clicking
of the s·ignal light inside the bus just shortly prior to
the collision.

(Tr. 765}.

Finally, Linda Mark testified

that s-h.e had been picked up by the :0.us just prior to
the accident and that she directly passed the back of the
bus at such time and saw

the brake lights and the

bo~h

turn signal light functioning.

(Tr. 806-8081.

The preceding is illustrative of the conflicting testimon
which existed at the trial.

Concededly, plaintiffs pro-

duced witnesses who stated the lights were not functioning
at the time of the accident, attempted to show that an
intermittent short was present in the system which could
not be no:r:mally detected, and otherwise attempted to
all of the witnesses previously listed.

impea~

Nevertheless, the

credibility of this evidence was a question for the jury
to decide.
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Defendants contended that the

t"lts

should never have been submitted to the jury since Mr.
Talbot

clearly stated on cross-examination that he

had not seen the bus prior to the time it was immediately
in front of him and that he had no difficulty in realizing
it was stopped.

(Tr. 562}.

Defendants contended therefore

that even if the company was negligent in the maintenance
of the lights that, as a matter of law, there was no
proximate causation between the lights and the actions of
the jeep driver.
This contention is borne out in- Jilka v., National Mutual
Casualty Company of Tulsa, 106 P.2d 665 (Kan. 1940), where it
was stated that where the abs.ence of lights or warning
signals do not prevent motorists from seeing a vehicle
in time to avoid colliding with it, their absence is not
the proximate cause of the resulting collisiono

Like•ise,

in Stoddard v. Nelson, 581 P.2d 339 (Ida. 1978), the court
stated that the failure to have operating headlights on a
motor vehicle does not create liability unless the absence
of such lights is a proximate cause of the collision.
Finally, this Court in Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 366 P.2d 989 (Utah 19-611, discussed an argument raised
by a defendant that a truckdriver had failed to put out

warning flares in back of his stopped vehicle.
such argument, this Court stated,

~'If

In rejecting

there had been flares

out, or even if the. truck had been aflame, it could have
given him no more information.

•1c

Id. at 9_90.
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•

Similarly, in this case the presence of warning
ligh.ts, a flagmelin, or any- other attention .... getting device
would h.ave had no effect upon the actions of the jeep
driver since he- only saw the bus for th.e first time
when he was almost on top of it.

rn any event, however,

the Court did submit Both the issue of negligence and
proximate cause to the jury as to the maintenance of the
equipment.
Plaintiffs-•· third contention was that since the bus
driver failed to recall seeing tiie jeep in his mirror as
he pulled over he was guilty of maintaining an improper
lookout as a matter of law.

Negligence is defined as a

breach of a duty to use due care under the circumstances
of a situation.

Wheeler v. i:J'o"nes, 431 P. 2d 986 (Utah 1967)_.

Mr. Loosemore testified at trial that before pulling over
to the side of the road to pick up the passenger he looked
in his mirrors and recalled s-eeing a white stationwagon.
He stated that he was sure there were other vehicles
behind it but did not pay any attention to them.

(Tr. 639).

While the length of time that the bus stopped was
contested by the plaintiff, tnere was no doubt that the bus
was stopped.

The time varied from a minimum of one second

to a maximum of over 10 seconds.

rt was also undisputed

that the stop made by the bus driver was gradual and smooth
and was in no way abrupt or s-udden.

Certainly, it could

not be said as a matter of law that the failure of the bus
driver to look into the mirror while the bus was stopped
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or inunediately preceding such stop could have, as a
matter of law, been ne9li9ence on his part when it was
disputed whether the jeep would even have :Deen in the
inunediate range of the mirror when the s·top was made.
Plaintiffs were permitted to argue this alleged act
of negligence to the jury as cons-tituting negligent conduct
on the part of the ous driver.

Once again, defendants

contended that, as a matter of law, even if the driver
was negligent in failing to observe. the approaching jeep,
such negligence would not be a proximate cause of the
accident..

The trial court, nevertheless, submitted both

issues to the jury and the jury found against the plaintiffs.
It is therefore obvious that the alleged negligence of
the defendant bus driver or the UTA was either a matter of
fact for the jury to determine or, as- a matter of law,
should never have been submitted to the jury in the first
place because of the. ;ea!.lure. to sh.ow any proximate cause
which could have resulted even from proven negligence ..
Nevertheless-, the lower court gave plaintiffs every
opportunity to argue and prove all elements of defendantst
alleged negligence and no error prejudicial to plaintiffs
was commi.:ttedo

:POINT III.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 GIVEN BY THE TR.IAL COURT
WAS

PROPER.

Appellants quote 't:in part"' I:nstruction 14 in their brief ..
Since

ins~tructions

must :Oe viewed as a whole, however, it
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is. necessary to e.xamine the. entire Instruction and not just
th.at portion quoted B.y the apl?e.llants.

Instruction 14 in

its entirety· states the following:
In this case, in addition to denying that

they were negligent as claimed by the plaintiffs,
or negligent in any manner whatsoever, the
defendants have asserted the defense that the
actions of the driver of the jeep in which the
plaintiff was riding were an independent,
intervening proximate cause of the accident,
and therefore the sole proximate cause of the
accident and plaintiff•s subsequent injuries.
'I'o be an independent intervening cause that
would relieve another's negligence from being
a proximate cause, it must O.e negligence that
was not foreseeable.
In that regard, you are instructed that the
driver of the jeep, Rodney Talbot, was
negligent as a matter of law, and if you find
th.at he observed the bus stopped upon the
high.way, or, under th.e circumstances should
have observed the bus, but because of his
negligence failed to do so in time to
avoid the accident, then you are instructed
that the negligence on. hi.? part was the sole
proximate cause of the collision.
If you find Talbot did not observe the bus
in time to avoid it, and it could reasonably
be anticipated that circumstances may arise
wherein one may not observe such a dangerous
condition until too late to escape (i.e.,
reasonably anticipated that an emergency might
arise) , then his negligence would not be the
s·ole proximate cause.
(R. 2531 .
Th.us, the instruction correctly covers two types of
situations:

first, whether Talbot had sufficient time to

observe the bus but failed to do so and, consequently, was
the sole proximate cause of the accident; second, whether
Talbot was put into an emergency situation in which he had
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no time to observe the bus and whether Loosernore should
have

anti.ci~ated

that a driver could have been placed

in a situation where he could not escape.
The last sentence of Hillyard v. Utah Byproducts
Company, 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953} cited by the appellants
in their bri.ef .ts applica.Ble to this distinction:
The distinction is basically one between a
situation in which the second actor has
sufficient time, after Being charged with
knowledge of the hazard to avoid it, and
one in which the second actor negligently
becomes confronted with an emergency
situation. 263 P.2d at 292.
It should be noted that except for the last paragraph
of Instruction No. 14 the instruction was nearly identical
to that given and approved in McMurdie
P .. 2d 711 (Utah 19.59_)_.

v~

Underwood, 346

The instruction in th.at case read

as follows:
You are instructed that the driver of the
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of
law, and if you find that sh_e observed the
hazards, if any of the stopped vehicles
upon the highway or under the circumstances
should have observed said vehicles, but
because of her negligence failed to do so in
time to avoid said accident, then you are
instructed that the negligence on her part
was the sole proximate cause of the
collision • • . Id. at 712.
The cases of Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 366 Po2d
989- (_Utah 19611, and l\nders·on: v. ;Parsons Red-E-Mix Paving

Company, 467 P.2d 45 (Utah 19701, also support the proposition
that a driver who has an unobstructed view of a stopped
vehicle., fiut who does not exercis-e that view is negligent and
-25-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is the sole proxim.ate. cause o;f an accident, just as is
stated i,n para,9ra.I?h- 3 of Instruction No. 14.
The last paragraph of Ins'truction 14 adopts the
foreseeability expansion as stated in the Watters case.
This Court in Watters held that if an emergency situation
is created where the oncoming driver does not have opportunity to sufficiently obs-erve tfi.e situation, then the
question arises as to whether the stopped vehicle driver
should have been able to foresee that the vehicle
following would be placed in a perilious situation by
the actions· of the first vehicle ..
The final paragraph. of Instruction 14 clearly allows
the jury to consider whether or not such a situation existed
and wheth.er the. bus driver should have foreseen a dangerous
situation being created by his stop.
The recent case of Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, No. 16417 (Utah, April 15, 1980},
also supports this instruction.

In that case it was held

that the question of proximate cause and foreseeability must
be decided by a factfinder even if it is assumed that
negligence is established as a matter of law.

The second

paragraph of Instruction 14 and the fourth paragraph of
Instruction 14 clearly adopt the foreseeability standard
and allow the jury to weigh whether or not the bus driver
could have. foreseen the actions taken by the jeep driver.
There was ample evidence presented to the jury for it
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to conclude that the jeep driver

~

1rtunitY

to observe the bus in front of him, but simply £ailed to
do so.

'l'he evidence. sh.owed th.at no '·"emergency situation'"

existe.d and that Loosemore could not have reasonably
foreseen that a vehicle traveling in b.ack

oe

the bus

at a distance of many hundred feet would not see a large
bus parked to the side of the road in broad daylight and
be able to pass it with. 1-1/2

sou~thbound

lanes available.

For these reasons, Instruction 14 was a correct statement of current Utah. law and was not erroneous.
POI·NT IV.
THE

JUR~

INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, WERE

INCOMPLETE·, AND DID NOT
OVEREMPHASI-ZE DEFENDANTS• THEORY OF THE CASEe

NOT IMPROPER OR

Plaintiffs make numerous complaints concerning the
remaining jury instructions.,

(Appellants• brief, pp. 15-16).

These arguments toe are groundles·s.
Plaintiffs complain that the lower court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that the negligence of Talbot could
not be i_mpute.d to plaintiff Matthew H:arris and in failing to
instruct the jury that Matthew Harris was himself not negligent

e

Since defendants did not claim that HarriS' was

negligent or claim that the negligence of Talbot should be
attributed to Harris, such an instructio_n would only have
confused the jury.
A court is not required to instruct a jury on questions
and issues which are not presented in the lawsuit.
Court has held that

J;lO

This

instruction should be. given unless

-27-
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it is both necessa,ry and applica.b.le to the fact situation
involved in the cg.s:e_..
19.591.

In

~act,.

~dley v~

woo<)__,. 345 P. 2d 19.7 (Utah

it is error to instruct on legal propositiom

that are_ not within th_e issues- of the case and on which there
is no evidence presented.
{J~. M.

~yder

v. Sandlin, 374 P.2d 133

1962)_.

Plaintiffs-further complain that their theory of the
case wa,s not presented By the lower court since their
Instruction No. 1 was not given whereas they claim
Instruction No. 14 stated defendants
A

t

theory of the case.

comparison of these ins-tructions, however, does not support

this contention.

Plaintiffs l Requested Instruction No. 1 is

an elaborate recitation of the facts similar to that given
by counsel in his opening argument to the jury.

Instruction

No. 14, on the other hand, merely explains and defines the
elements necessary- for an independent, intervening proximate
cause ..
The fact that the first paragraph to Instruction 14 makes
refere:nae to defendants' •tasserted defense'" hardly makes
the Instruction a "theory of the case."

The_ jury was entitled

and had to know the elements of intervening proximate cause
in order to understand all of the issues and defenses raised
by the parties.

However / the. jury did not need to know the

alleged factual occurrences claimed by plaintiffs in the form

I

of a jury instruction.

Next, plaintiffs complain that proposed Instruction No. 201
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

was not given which would have told the jury to draw no
inference. trom the ;fact that Talbot was not a party in the
proceeding..

This, like the first complaints of plaintiffs,

was an irrelevant instruction request since. there was
never any claim :O.y defendants that Talbot should have been
a party to the lawsuit or that his· presence had any effect
upon the negligence of the plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that, oecause witnesses
testified that a second southbound lane was unobstructed,
an instruction should have been given stating that such
unobstructed lane. did not lessen Loosemore' s duty to pull
off the road.

Again, tfiere was no claim by defendants that

the existence of a free lane of traffic lessened Loosemore's
duty pursuant to the Utah statute or that the existence of
the other 1 ane made pulling over to the curb 'timpractical o"
The existence of the southbound lane, however, was
pertinent in establishing the conduct of Talbot as to whether
he had an opportunity both_ to observe the bus and to avoid
itG

Plaintiffst speculation that the jury could interpret

the other southbound lane to negate the effect of the
statutory parking requirement does not rise to the level of
a valid objection.
The instructions given to the jury were fair, complete,
and not

misleadi~g~.

No error was made in either the giving

of the Court •·s ins.tructions

Ol:

.i::_n the omission of the

instructions offe.re.d by plai.nttf f s ~29~
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·;e~IN'l'

VI.

';[;'HE COURT DI:D NOT ERR IN. EXCLUDI}fG PLAINTI;F~s-•·

EXHIBI.'l1S

N.~.

42 ;\ND 4 3"

:,Plaintif.fs· claim that the lowe.r court erred in excluding
Exhibits 42 and 43 which consiste.d of maintenance records
of the bus subsequent to the accident.
is unsupporta:Ole.

Such a proposition

I't s·hould be noted at the outset that

the trial court allowed Exhibits 40 and 41 into evidence.
These· exhibits were an itemized listing of all of the defects
and electrical defe.cts· reported on the bus from 1975 until
(Tr. 219 I .

the date of the accident.

Mr. Daniel L.

Newland, UTA' s shop foreman, was· extensively examined by
plaintiffst counsel as to the alleged defects existing in
bus prior to the accident.

t~

(Tr. 695.,,..,696) •

The trial court ;refused to admit Exhibits 42 and 43,
however, for several reasons.
did not show re.pair

o~

First, the proposed exhibits

the rear lights per se, but concern

all of the electrical system of the bus including the
speedometer, dimmer swi tcfi.es, headlights and electric doors.
The exhibita,.. themselves, therefore, do not go to the specifi
condition of the rear lights but contain extraneous informati
which could only prejudice the defendants by allowing the ju
to conclude that the bus was in general disrepair.
Second, th.ere was no evidence shown that any subsequent
defects in the electrical system of the bus was not caused
by the accident itself.

The collision with Talbot required

the "wiring up of new lights'" as shown in Exhibit 43.
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710).

Defendants put in evidence

(Tr.

1

showed that it was necessary to replace the le;Et side
electrical sX"stem of the h.us .;i,ncluding the bulbs, the
retlectors, a,nd. the ?anel.

(Tr.

1ag1.

Finally, Utah law is well-settled that subsequent
repairs cannot :Ce used to establish that a former condition
was unsafe or was negli.gently maintained.

Potter v. Dr.

W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints: Hospital, 103 P. 2d 280 (Utah
1940).

In spite of plaintiffs• contentions, the proposed

exhibits could not be used to establish a prior condition
since the collision itself damaged the electrical system
making it irrelevant as to subsequent repairs.
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that a trial
court is gi:ven considerable discretion in deciding whether

or not evidence· submitted is relevant.

Lambrough v. Bethers,

552 Po2d 1286 (Utah 1976).

~-evidence

Even if the

was wrong-

fully excluded, that fact alone is insufficient to satisfy
a verdict unles·s it has "a s·ubstantial influence in bringing
about the verdict.••·

Rule 4b, Rules of Evidence, Utah 1971.

In this case the trial court was jus·tified in refusing
to admit the subsequent repairs of the bus for the reasons
stated.

No error was committed.
CONCLUSION

The trial of this matter consumed four days of court
hearings, involved 19 witnesses, and introduced over 50 exhibits.
The legal issues now before this Court were carefully briefed
by both parties during the trial and the lower court heard
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The jury returned a verdict finding no
part of defendants.

~e-gligence

on the

There was substantial evidence to

support this verdict and, in fact, plaintiffs do not contest
the evidence supporting the jury verdict.
Rather, plaintiffs maintain that the court committed
prejudicial error in instructing the jury that the jeep
driver was negligent as a matter of law.

The evidence

shows, however, that reasonable minds could not differ
that Rodney Talbot was in fact negligent.

The evidence

was uncontroverted that Talbot had an unobstructed view
of the bus, that-the road conditions were good, but that
he simply did not see the. bus because of inattention on
his part.
This is not a case, as claimed by plaintiffs, where one
driver is following another driver who suddenly stops,
thereby causing the second driver to collide.

Here, the

evidence is clear that the bus had pulled over onto the
shoulder of the road in a smooth normal stop and was loading
the passenger for a minimum of at least one second and
a maximum of over 10 seconds before the collision occurred.
Talbot- himself - admitted that he never saw the bus until
a split second before he hit it, thereby negating any claim

of negligence as to the location of the bus or as to its
~unctioning

tail lights.

Again, it should be remembered that only the issue of
negligence of Talbot was directed by the court and not the
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question of proximate cause which-i..s_ the ultimate issue
-.._._i-_

'-~

I

',

in cases such as this.

'l'he jury, in spite of the court's

direction, still could h.ave concluded that the negligence
of the defendants was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
Talbot was clearly negligent as a matter of law.
Loosemore, on the other hand, was negligent only if he
violated the parking statute, only if the violation of
such statute was unreasonable, only if his lights were.
not functioning :properly, and only if he maintained an
improper lookout.

Unlike the case of Talbot, Loosemore's

claimed negligence could only Be determined by evaluating
the disputed evidence presented by both sides.
For these reasons, the Court properly submitted the
question of Talbot,. s causation, and Loosemore "s negligence
and causation to the jury for its determinationo
Likewise, rnstruction 14 was completely proper in that
it correctly incorporated the s.tartdard of Hillyard v.
Utah Byproducts as modified by Watters v. Q·uerry .
Plaintiffst other complaints concerning giving or
faili.."lg to give instructions are equally w-i thout merit.
A lower court has no obligation to instruct the jury
on mere "possibilitiesn· speculated UJ?On by the I?laintiffs.
The instructions, as a whole, were

~a~r

and complete.

Finally·,. the lowe.r court did not erl:' in ,::-efusing to
admit the. subseguent repair records of the nus since such
records did not refer specifically to the rear lights of the
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bus, the. da,mages could have be.en caused by the accident
itself, and the re.cords: could only be shown for the purpose
of establishing negligence which is contrary to existing
Utah law.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the jury verdict
should be. affirmed ..
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondent

MA!LING CER,'l'IFICATE

I hereby certify that I served two copies of the
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mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Merlin Lybbert,
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